Abstract: Hydro-diplomacy conversations have up till now been generally state-and basin-centric, focused on formal international relations and transboundary rivers. This paper applies the notion of water diplomacy to a project in rural Southwest Morocco in order to interrogate the scalar potential of water-based environmental peacebuilding.
Introduction
In its rationale for naming 2013 as the International Year of Water Cooperation, the United Nations exclaimed, "148 countries share at least one transboundary river basin". Threequarters of the world's nation-states are home to a river that crosses a political border, and this comes with a swatch of political and environmental challenges in need of creative solutions. In the past few years, "hydro-diplomacy" (or water diplomacy) has emerged as one such intended approach. The logic of water diplomacy builds on debates over environmental security, conflict, cooperation, and peacebuilding that gained traction at the end of the Cold War. Like these other fields, hydro-diplomacy is rooted in international relations scholarship, and thus emphasizes the state as the primary actor under consideration. And as is typical of hydro-political work, water diplomacy defaults to the river basin as the principal unit of analysis. This combination of biases creates a major gap for hydro-diplomacy policy and practice.
This piece seeks to highlight what hydro-diplomacy misses when rivers and states are effectively the singular scalar focus of its scope. It has five primary objections: (1) to review the emergence of hydro-diplomacy theory as a response to and expansion of environmental security and environmental peacebuilding narratives; (2) to demonstrate the state-centrism and basin bias inherent in water diplomacy scholarship and practice; (3) to show how theories of track diplomacy and attention to wide-ranging hydrologic realities can fill the hole resulting from those biases; (4) to showcase an innovative example of applied hydrodiplomacy through community-level knowledge and cultural exchange driven by fogharvesting; and (5) to argue that the water diplomacy literature will be more robust and effective if it moves beyond its limited scalar predispositions.
The paper will first report the methods guiding this examination (Section 2), then provide a review and critique of relevant theory (Section 3). A case study on Moroccan fog-harvesting is given in Section 4, with the subsequent conclusions presented in Section 5.
Methods
This article situates practitioner accounts of and approaches to water-based public diplomacy in the emerging literature on hydro-diplomacy. Theoretical examination is based on an extensive literature review of water diplomacy conceptualizations as drawn from environmental studies, international relations, geography, hydro-politics, and law. Particular emphasis was placed on (1) the predominant, mainstream discourses of water diplomacythose perpetuated by powerful actors such as the United Nations -and (2) authors and schools of thought examining multi-level stakeholders and non-traditional actors or settings.
Empirical data is drawn from three years of participant observation with a case study in 
Data collection involved conducting fifteen semi-structured interviews with participants in
Dar Si Hmad's exchange programs, conference engagement at ten international meetings across four continents, and document analysis of organizational archives. In addition to five years of applied practice, Dar Si Hmad has conducted a decade of meteorological observation and feasibility research. This article makes use of information from technical reports, grant applications, press releases, and curriculum developed since 2006.
In Theory

Water Diplomacy: An Emerging Theory
Taken at face value in the broadest possible sense, 'hydro-diplomacy' simply refers to all diplomatic relations and efforts relating to water. By this reading, hydro-diplomacy (or water diplomacy) has been practiced throughout history. However, over the past decade, the phrase has come to be used in a few particular ways by theorists and practitioners of international water relations.
Theories of water diplomacy are rooted in critical hydro-politics and scholarship over environmental conflict, cooperation, security, and peacebuilding. "Environmental conflict" became a buzzword in the international security arena in the 1990s (Timura 2001) . A first "wave" (Lonergan 2000, 67; Levy 1995) of academic exploration in the early 1990s presented a rationale suggesting that the environment -particularly, natural resource scarcity -could cause conflict (Homer-Dixon 1991; Libiszewski 1992; Bächler 1994) . A second wave sought methodologies for proving those ties and a third was called for to explore nuances, with criticisms focused on the relative lack of empirically based work clearly demonstrating claimed causal links (Levy 1995; Diehl and Gleditsch 2000) . A 1998 critique of Homer-Dixon's early work led to a back-and-forth series of articles by scholars debating methodologies and assumptions (most notably Gleditsch 1998; Schwartz, Deligiannis, and Homer-Dixon 2000) .
Researchers in the early 2000s responded to calls for more robust consideration and began building a counter-narrative pushing against pessimistic conceptions of environmental conflict. Deterministic ideas continue to persist, with recent disasters and political turmoil sparking renewed interest in environmental and climate-related tensions, but the academic community has generally come to agree that the environment itself is not a sole cause of war -rather, it may serve to trigger or further violent outcomes locally or regionally (Conca 2002, 1) , with quantitative analysis finding that "states suffering from greater levels of environmental scarcity are more likely to be involved in a militarized international dispute" (Stalley 2003, 33 ).
Specific to hydro-politics, Wolf and Hamner found that violence over water generally takes place on a sub-state level in non-armed conflict settings (2000, 128) but that this violence may cross national borders and has impacts beyond the immediate location of the conflict.
Though Homer-Dixon posited that the catalytic potential will become greater as environmental degradation leads to further scarcity (1999), Allan demonstrated how the realities of today's global political economy have helped to mitigate conflict in the Middle East through virtual water (Allan 2003) . Further quantitative analysis has shown assumptions about environmental conflict -most notably the theory of 'water wars' -"to be at best overly pessimistic and at worst grossly mistaken" (Arsel 2011, 450) . Dinar and Dinar argue that water, when pertinent to survival for a state, may "either impede or enhance negotiation over the resource " (2000) . Quantity and scarcity is thus not a determining factor in conflict; rather, whether or not the parties choose to negotiate is influenced by other issues like political willingness, geography, military/economic power, soft power asymmetries, and governance (Dinar and Dinar 2000; Dinar, Dinar and Kurukulasuriya 2011) .
It is against this backdrop that ideas of water diplomacy took the stage, first appearing as water-based environmental cooperation. On World Water Day 2002, then-U.N. SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan stated in his statement of support that "the water problems of our world need not be only a cause of tension; they can also be a catalyst for cooperation". Academic and policy minds view water as playing "a unique and varied role" (Weinthal, Troell and Nakayama 2011, 143) , a resource that "by its nature, tends to induce even hostile co-riparian countries to co-operate" (Kader Asmal quoted in Conca 2002, 3) . Instrumentally, " [w] ater, if properly restored and managed, can be harnessed to play a critical role in post-conflict recovery by protecting public health, restoring livelihoods, supporting economic recovery, and facilitating reconciliation" (Crawford, Jensen, and Bruch 2014, 1) . Some see the role between water and conflict as so intrinsically tied that the two become nearly synonymous: "Water management is, by definition, conflict management" (Wolf in Fetzer Institute 2011, 19) . School 1 emphasizes the need for cooperation in order to address water issues. In this framing, "water diplomacy is a theory and practice of adaptive water management" to manage "conflicts over water" through "diplomacy that takes science, policy, and politics into account" (Islam and Susskind 2012, 323) . Water diplomacy's purpose is to put the skills "of the diplomatic body to the benefits of challenges posed by the decrease in per capita freshwater quantities" (UNITAR 2013, 9) . It "includes all measures…that can be undertaken to prevent or peacefully resolve (emerging) conflicts and facilitate cooperation related to water availability, allocation or use" (Huntjens et al. 2016, 4) .
Beyond using diplomatic tools to prevent or resolve water-related conflicts, some theorists argue that water diplomacy can "transform the potential risk of competing demands…over water into forms of cooperation that extend beyond water and economics" (Hefny 2011, 26) .
The adelphi report suggests that "transboundary water governance can give foreign policy makers a toehold for making progress on crucial foreign policy interests…a promising entry point for diplomats aiming for high peace dividends" (Pohl et al. 2014, i) .
The more expansive take of School 2 borrows from the logic of environmental peacebuilding, which can be seen as the umbrella field of water diplomacy. Early writing on the topic sought "to pinpoint the cooperative triggers of peace that shared environmental problems might make available" and to "ask whether environmental cooperation can trigger broader forms of peace" (Conca 2003, 5) . Advocates of environmental peacebuilding assert "It will be relatively easier to initiate cooperation on environmental matters than on other issues" and that "environmental cooperation may in turn spill over to help the countries in the region build the mutual trust necessary to address other traditional issues of dispute" (Swain 2002, 81) . This is hardly an automatic process, of course. "Cooperation on the Indus River shows that even under the most problematic conditions, water can bring cooperation", but "it is up to the state actors to make choices and nurture that water-based cooperation into peacemaking" (ibid, 82).
Regardless of whether hydro-diplomacy is framed as cooperation for water or water for peace, it is important to consider the fundamental nature of the cooperation or conflict at play. In most of the literature on environmental conflict and cooperation, the two are presented as a dichotomous either/or. Using examples from transboundary river basins, however, Mirumachi shows how conflict and cooperation can coexist, with the same parties agreeing and collaborating on some aspects of governance and supply while clashing over others (Mirumachi 2015; see also 2006; and Zeitoun and Mirumachi 2008) .
Additionally, environmental cooperation can exist alongside not only environmental conflict but also other forms of political and/or military conflict: Through the Indus Waters Treaty, India and Pakistan were able to "safeguard their long-term water supply" through cooperation even in the midst of "wider tensions between the two countries" (Alam 2002, 350) . Nor does environmental cooperation on one issue guarantee cooperation on others: The Indus Waters Treaty "did not lead to an easing of tensions over other areas of dispute such as Kashmir" (Alam 2002, 350) .
As well as underscoring that conflict and cooperation can take place at the same time, critical hydro-politics literature has demonstrated that cooperation is not automatically positive: "the mere existence of cooperation is less important than the content, scope, and orientation of that cooperation" (Conca and Dabelko 2002, 222) . Treaties may end surface violence even as they "fail to create warm relations or eradicate mistrust" (Mitha 2010, 124) . 'Cooperation' is a multifaceted process and concept, and does not always involve relationship building or systemic fixes. "Functional cooperation", for example, is "driven by bottom-up technical and situational demands" (Tanner et al. 2007, 186) . The historical tendency to seek technological fixes to environmental problems can limit the efficacy of environmental cooperation and be detrimental to long-term sustainability, as it avoids addressing the related social and cultural insensitivities and tensions (Nalven 1986 ). Mirumachi shows how securitizing the Tanakpur Barrage allowed Nepal and India to form an agreement rather than entering into state conflict but that this cooperation did not necessarily lead to ideal outcomes for the environment or people (2013).
Nor is all conflict is inherently bad. Conflict can help encourage societies to create the tools needed for responding to scarcity. " [P] articipatory and inclusive resource management regimes may enable communities to construct resource use conflicts in ways that help to prevent unproductive conflict" (Martin 2005, 329) . In order to reach its full potential, hydrodiplomacy theory, policy, and practice must take these lessons into account.
Transboundary Water Interactions: The River Runs Deep
Despite scholarship warning about the potential pitfalls of superficial cooperation, hydrodiplomacy literature continues to champion technical collaboration and shared institutions for water management with relatively little critique or long-term impact evaluation. Nor is this its only gap.
Like the vast majority of hydrological and hydro-political scholarship, water diplomacy is intensely focused on rivers. In practice and analysis, transboundary rivers and basins are some of the most visible and tangible shared natural resources. It is thus unsurprising that a great deal of the water diplomacy literature has focused primarily on rivers, appearing in academic and policy minds as the stage on which hydro-diplomacy plays out. The adelphi report on hydro-diplomacy consistently refers to river basin organizations as primary actors and makes use of no fewer than nine international rivers to showcase the theory's potential.
The Hague Institute for Global Justice's program on water diplomacy specifically positions their work within a river basin wide context (Huntjens et al. 2016 , ii). Hefny's approach is one of a process "among riparian states", again reiterating the river-centrism (2011, 21) .
Another definition explicitly focuses water diplomacy as happening "over transboundary freshwater resources such as lake, river, and aquifer basins" (Genderen and Rood 2011, 10) . This last at least acknowledges groundwater -a major resource vastly under-considered in water law and governance (see Eckstein 2017) -but continues to limit the physical, spatial scale of hydro-diplomacy by remaining basin-centric. "Transboundary waters" seem to have become effectively synonymous with "river".
In reality, rivers are a mere fraction of the planet's water resources (0.0002% (Shiklomanov 1993)). Limiting hydro-diplomacy to freshwater discounts 97% of the Earth's supply, even as this ocean-based bulk becomes increasingly used for anthropocentric purposes via desalination, saline water agriculture, and the like. Even when considering only freshwater not frozen in glaciers or in underground aquifers, rivers contribute only 0.5%; atmospheric water accounts for six times that amount and soil moisture nearly eight times (ibid).
There is thus a strong disconnect between hydrological realities and hydro-political emphasis.
In a piece reflecting on a decade of critical hydro-hegemony theoretical work, the London Water Research Group acknowledged their own river-centrism and called for scholarship to move "beyond the river basin as the primary unit of analysis in international water issues" (Warner et al. 2017, 5) . The water diplomacy community must do the same if it is to fully realize its potential as an interdisciplinary, intersectoral approach to shared water management.
International Cooperation: Multi-level Actors and Track Diplomacy
In addition to maintaining a disproportionate focus on rivers as the unit of analysis, hydropolitics has followed classic international relations in being state-centric. Nation-states and state-based institutions are regularly seen and approached as the primary actors in water diplomacy. Some basic definitions even go so far as to require a state actor: "Water diplomacy, also referred to as hydro-diplomacy, can be broadly defined as all contact between (non-)state actors and at least one state or international governmental organizations…" (Genderen and Rood 2011, 10, emphasis added). In their water diplomacy glossary, leading theorists Islam and Susskind define diplomacy as "the practice of interaction among nations aimed at avoiding hostility among the parties" (2012, 317). Most scholars agree that Track 1 Diplomacy is more 'effective' or necessary to gain peace.
Böhmelt argues that this is because it gets more resources, and while this may be true to some extent, we can also challenge what is meant by 'effective'. When efficacy is measured in terms of a formal settlement or ceasefire at the highest levels (as it is in Böhmelt 2010), the armed violence may well end. But this does not necessarily promise any sort of friendliness between the countries, an end to tensions, or resolution of the initiating problems. Track 2 Diplomacy, on the other hand, can be strongly tied to sustainable peace in its work to overcome stereotypes of negative perceptions and rehumanize the 'other'; reframe stories and historical narratives of conflict; empower young people and others through training; and solve shared problems (Çuhadar and Dayton 2012) . Derian suggests that diplomacy can be thought of as the mediation of the process of othering; his use of theories of alienation and estrangement -and the growing attention to Tracks 1.5, 2, and 3 -can be seen as making diplomacy scholarship and practice less state-centric and focused on society as a whole (1987).
Diplomacy is changing, engaging non-traditional actors and methods. With this evolution, its study is becoming more and more relevant to sustainable development and durable peace.
Segments of the water diplomacy literature are beginning to do the same; the Hague Institute, for example, acknowledges the role of "state and non-state actors, "between and within states", for "public and private stakeholders" (Huntjens et al. 2016, 4) . As hydro-diplomacy continues to develop and grow in prominence, its advocates should make use of progressive knowledge and theories in both hydrology and diplomacy -rather than being innovative only by combining base traditions in two fields -in order to ensure its relevance and maximize its impact. This paper now turns to an empirical case study and analysis demonstrating how this might be done.
In Practice
Dewing Diplomacy: Dar Si Hmad's Fog-Harvesting
Dar Si Hmad is a local non-profit in Southwest Morocco whose flagship project involves harvesting potable water from the region's intense fog cover to support local livelihoods.
Building from this unique technological intervention for sustainable development, the organization runs a variety of cultural exchange, scientific collaboration, and environmental education programming. Figure 1 provides an overview of Dar Si Hmad's related initiatives.
[FIGURE 1 HERE]
Aït Baamrane is at the edge of the Sahara and faces endemic drought with increasing regularly asking about when they would be added to the fog system, with skepticism and jealousy occasionally creating intercommunity tensions. Sustainability, both environmentally and financially, was another concern.
A new partnership with the German Water Foundation (Wasserstiftung) was formed. Through its multiple side projects, Dar Si Hmad leverages fog-harvesting technologies, water production, and associated research to foster equitable exchange, using the uniqueness of the project to draw in visitors and share a different story than the one usually told (Lansing and Farnum 2017) . Conversations between research partners, funding agencies, university professors and students, and the local communities enhance intercultural understanding.
Reflecting on their people-to-people diplomatic exchange efforts, staff members say "There is a change in the way they perceive Arabs, Berbers, Muslims" that visitors take back to their home communities. The team sees "having the opportunity to bring together different ideologies, different countries, different cultures, different minds, different backgrounds" as a way "to meet and to understand each other and to try to discuss issues between them before they become huge and difficult…If we have more chances like this, I think we are more able to build peace in the world".
The logic of Water Diplomacy School 2 suggests that "transboundary water governance" is "a promising entry point for diplomats" that "can give foreign policy makers a toehold" (Pohl et al. 2014, i Secondly, supplying water to villages may inadvertently help cover, push aside, or even exacerbate underlying concerns and inequalities. The fog system creates a de facto equality of time between the sexes, saving women hours each day without the need to walk to neighborhood wells and making household chores a great deal easier. However, gender equity should not be assumed as an immediate effect of water provision. In many waterscarce regions, women have a privileged ancestral role as water guardians. Serving as resource gatekeepers is a source of power for women and may be one of the few ways women in villages can materially exert their agency -a hard tool when soft diplomacy fails.
Water supply projects that do not take these considerations into account can inadvertently create harm, disrupting traditional gender norms without facilitating positive alternatives. Dar Si Hmad's participatory approach to the fog-harvesting initiative identified this as a potential issue early on. Recognizing water as a source of power, the organization worked to ensure women continued to hold control in the new system through creative technologies and capacity-building programs (see Dodson 2014; Dodson and Bargach 2015) . Without that careful attention and the implementation of targeted programming, both the cooperation for water and water for peace hydro-diplomatic efforts of Dar Si Hmad may have come at the cost of further disadvantaging indigenous women.
These findings should serve as a cautionary tale for the hydro-diplomacy community: The potential is vast. But not all of that potential is positive. Regular assessment, community engagement, and intentional efforts to include the most vulnerable in ways led by them are necessary to ensure that water-based collaborations are positive for everyone.
Conclusions
Theorizations of water-related conflict, cooperation, and peacebuilding have come a long way since the pessimistic and under-researched 'water wars' claims of the 1990s. Hydrodiplomacy has broken new ground as an innovative integration of water resources management, international relations, and environmental cooperation. Yet for all its vision, the concept remains embedded in the biases of its source disciplines.
Water is more than a river, and diplomacy more than a treaty. Basin-and state-centrism in hydro-diplomacy limit its potential for ingenuity. Theorists and policymakers should see past the obvious mechanisms of water diplomacy to learn lessons from practice happening at other scales. Expanded hydrological concepts like the precipitationshed (Keys et al. 2012 ) and political theories such as public diplomacy are available to us. Empirical data from applied initiatives, among them Dar Si Hmad's fog-harvesting system and related technical and cultural exchange programs, exists. Desegregating our thinking around and amalgamating lessons drawn from a wide range of water-based approaches to relationship-building will further the field of hydro-diplomacy. If we are able to step outside the bounds of our river basins, our state-level analyses, and our subject boxes, the transboundary and transdisciplinary field of hydro-diplomacy can equip us all -individuals, groups, organizations, and states -to be water-led peacemakers. 
